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INTRODUCTION
In an emphatic proclamation that may have far-reaching
implications for Second Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
recently held that the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is
fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty. 1 In a plurality opinion,
the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago declared that the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is
incorporated and fully applicable to the States by virtue of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
Similar to the First and Fourth Amendments, the Second
Amendment codifies a pre-existing right 3 and has recently been the
focus of two of the most prominent Supreme Court decisions in the
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Political Science, 2008, Indiana University Bloomington.
1
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010)
(plurality opinion).
2
Id.; see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570–71 (2008)
[hereinafter Heller I].
3
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3066; Heller I, 554 U.S. at 591–92.
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past decade. Discussion concerning the Second Amendment is not
reserved for the recondite and esoteric debates of academia. Rather,
the discussion extends to the public forum, where there are arguments
on the scope of the right to keep and bear arms, rallies that demand
rigorous gun control laws, 4 and theories regarding the intent of the
Framers of the Bill of Rights that divide the public, politicians, and
scholars.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in McDonald was preceded by the
landmark case of District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I). 5 The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District of Columbia
Circuit, invalidating a law banning the possession of handguns in the
District of Columbia, but in doing so neglected to identify a precise
level of judicial scrutiny; 6 rather, the Court left the difficult task of
determining the applicable level of scrutiny to the various federal
courts, a challenge they would be forced to face when presented with
subsequent challenges to laws banning the possession of firearms. The
decision not to address the judicial scrutiny quandary in Heller I was
mimicked by the Court in McDonald and has subsequently been
followed by a number of federal courts. 7 Recently, when presented
with the opportunity to address the “‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire” 8
left unanswered by Heller I and McDonald, 9 the Seventh Circuit

4

Saul Cornell, The Second Amendment Under Fire: The Uses of History and
the Politics of Gun Control, HISTORY MATTERS (Jan. 2001), http://historymatters.
gmu.edu/d/5200.
5
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 570–71.
6
Id. at 571 (“Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to
enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition—in the place where the importance
of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail
constitutional muster.”).
7
See cases cited infra notes 128–29.
8
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter
Skoien III].
9
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3066 (2010); Heller I,
554 U.S. at 627–29.
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declined to engage in meaningful judicial review. 10 This Comment
will critique the Seventh Circuit’s decision.
This Comment will begin with a brief discussion of Heller I and
will examine the impact of the Supreme Court’s proclamation that the
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is a right that precedes the
Constitution. Part II introduces the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun
Control Act of 1968, a statute that bars individuals convicted of
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms. 11
This section begins with the history behind the enactment of the
Lautenberg Amendment and ends with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the amendment in the context of Second Amendment
jurisprudence after Heller I. Part II also analyzes the factual
background and procedural history leading up to the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Skoien (Skoien III), and will include a
critique of the court’s decision in the aforementioned case. It will be
suggested that the Seventh Circuit erred by failing to confront the
“‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire” 12 when presented with the opportunity
in Skoien III. Part III will attempt to discern why a majority of courts
after Heller I applied the doctrine of intermediate scrutiny to
legislation that infringed on the right to keep and bear arms for selfdefense. This Comment will conclude with an abridged review of
McDonald and will suggest that there is sufficient case law to provide
a foundation for the application of strict scrutiny analysis to the
Lautenberg Amendment.
I. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
Heller I is a watershed case wherein the Supreme Court struck
down the District of Columbia’s handgun ban because the Second
Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right of lawabiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and

10

Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 641.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006).
12
Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 641–42.
11
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home.” 13 In Heller I, special police officer Dick Anthony Heller
brought an action challenging the District’s handgun ban on Second
Amendment grounds and sought to enjoin the District from enforcing
the aforementioned gun control statute. 14 The Supreme Court
embarked on a lengthy review of historical texts to aid in interpreting
the Second Amendment. 15 The Court highlighted post-ratification
sentiments, pre-Civil War case law, and post-Civil War legislation and
concluded that precedent does not preclude the espousal of the original
understanding of the Second Amendment. 16 Following a searching
inquiry and textualist reading of the Second Amendment, the Court
held that the Second Amendment codifies a pre-existing right to keep
and bear arms for self-defense. 17 Therefore, the Court declared
unconstitutional the District of Columbia’s ban on the possession of
handguns under its interpretation of the Second Amendment. 18 The
Court, however, maintained that “nothing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms,” which are “presumptively lawful” under the Court’s
ruling. 19 The Court then identified a number of “presumptively
lawful” regulatory measures, specifically prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, 20 and stated that
it “identif[ies] these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as
examples; [the] list does not purport to be exhaustive.” 21 In addition,
the Court in Heller I suggested that the two exacting levels of
heightened scrutiny—intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny—should

13

Heller I, 554 U.S. at 635.
Id. at 574–76.
15
Id. at 605–27.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 625.
18
Id. at 635.
19
Id. at 626, 627 n.26.
20
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348,
352 (5th Cir. 2009).
21
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
14
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be applied to laws that interfere with the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, and property. 22
The Court’s decision in Heller I has resulted in a myriad of
challenges to existing firearm legislation. By rejecting the collective
rights interpretation of the Second Amendment, 23 the Supreme Court
enabled the Second Amendment to be incorporated and fully
applicable to the States by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 24 Justice Stevens, writing in dissent,
cautioned that the Heller I ruling would leave lower federal courts
without a clear standard for resolving challenges to existing firearm
legislation. 25 Justice Stevens was correct to caution against the Court’s
decision in Heller I. As evidenced by the recent Seventh Circuit case,
Skoien III, the federal courts have had difficulty adjudicating Second
Amendment challenges to laws that infringe on the Second
Amendment. In Skoien III, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment in
the face of a Second Amendment challenge.26 However, the court
parroted the majority in Heller I and refused to apply a specific
standard of scrutiny. 27
II. UNITED STATES V. SKOIEN
Defendant Steven Skoien was convicted in 2006 of domestic
battery in a Wisconsin circuit court and sentenced to two years’
probation. 28 As a condition of his probation and in correspondence
22

Id. at 628–29; see id. at 628 n.27.
Id. at 579–80; see United States v. Skoien, 857 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2009)
[hereinafter Skoien II]; Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 711 (7th Cir.
1999).
24
See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty).
25
Id. at 718–19 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26
Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010).
27
See id.
28
Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 806.
23
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with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), Skoien was prohibited from possessing a
firearm. 29 In 2007, his probation officer learned that he had purchased
a deer-hunting license. 30 In light of the aforementioned discovery, the
probation officer believed that Skoien had purchased a firearm, and
probation agents searched his home as a result.31 Upon searching
Skoien’s property, Wisconsin probation agents discovered a
Winchester twelve-gauge shotgun, shotgun ammunition, a statuteissued tag for a gun deer kill in the name of Steven Skoien, and a deer
carcass in Skoien’s garage. 32 Skoien was subsequently indicted by a
federal grand jury for possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(9). 33
A. Skoien’s Second Amendment Claim
Skoien filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds
that § 922(g)(9) violated his Second Amendment right to keep and
bears arms. 34 At the time that Skoien filed his motion to dismiss,
Seventh Circuit precedent precluded him from alleging that §
922(g)(9) contravened the Second Amendment. 35 As a result, the
district court denied Skoien’s motion to dismiss. 36 Shortly after the
29

Id.
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment at ¶ 2, United States v. Skoien,
2008 WL 4682598 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 27, 2008) (No. 08-cr-12-bbc) [hereinafter
Skoien I]; see U.S. CONST. amend. II.
35
See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the link between the ability to “keep and bear Arms” and “a well
regulated Militia” is suggestive of the fact that the right does not extend to
individuals, but rather to the people collectively and only to the extent necessary to
protect their interest in protection by a militia); see also United States v. Price, 328
F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional under the
“collective rights” model for interpreting the Second Amendment).
36
Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1.
30
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aforementioned denial, the Supreme Court in Heller I held that the
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a firearm
for a lawful purpose, unrelated to service in a militia. 37 Consequently,
Skoien filed a motion to reconsider the motion to dismiss the
indictment. 38
In the defendant’s brief, a considerable amount of emphasis was
placed on Heller I, 39 which struck down the District of Columbia’s
handgun ban because it was too broad, extending to an entire class of
arms that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for the
lawful purposes of self-defense and hunting. 40 Skoien claimed that the
Winchester twelve-gauge shotgun is “clearly an ‘arm’ that is
overwhelmingly chosen by American society for the lawful purpose of
hunting.” 41 Furthermore, in light of the fact that the Court in Heller
declared that the Second Amendment codified a pre-existing
individual right to keep and bear arms, Skoien argued that the court in
the instant case must declare unconstitutional § 922(g)(9) if it
determines that the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest. 42
Judge Barbara Crabb of the Western District of Wisconsin
considered the motion to dismiss filed by Skoien, which alleged that §
922(g)(9) violated the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 43 Skoien acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9), but argued

37

Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 625–26 (2008).
See generally Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Motion
to Dismiss Indictment, Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598 (No. 08-cr-12-bbc).
39
See generally id.
40
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 625–30 (only the sorts of weapons that were in common
use at the time the Second Amendment was ratified are protected).
41
Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Motion to Dismiss
Indictment, supra note 38, at 3.
42
Id. at 4–5.
43
Skoien I, No. 08-cr-12-bbc, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 27,
2008).
38
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that the statute should be reevaluated in light of the recent Supreme
Court decision in Heller I. 44
In her analysis, Judge Crabb noted that the Court in Heller held
that the Second Amendment right to bear arms protects an individual
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation, but stated
that the Court did not address the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9).45 In
addition, Judge Crabb mentioned that the majority cautioned against
interpreting its decision as a suggestion that all gun laws and firearm
restrictions are unconstitutional. 46 Rather, the Court declared that its
opinion does not cast doubt on the countless longstanding prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by certain groups of individuals. 47
Skoien, however, urged the court to review § 922(g)(9) using the
doctrine of strict scrutiny, which requires a court to examine any
legislative action that impinges upon a fundamental right or involves
the use of a suspect classification to ensure that it is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling governmental purpose. 48
Skoien urged the court to consider the doctrine of strict scrutiny
when rendering its decision. 49 In the opinion of the court, Judge Crabb
acknowledged that strict scrutiny may be the appropriate standard to
apply to a legislative effort to restrict firearm possession, but noted
that it was unnecessary to resolve the issue in the instant case. 50 The
44

Id.
Id.; see Heller I, 554 U.S. at 582–83.
46
Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1.
47
Id. (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27) (“[N]othing in our opinion should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”).
48
Id.; see Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Where the
legislative classification works to the disadvantage of a constitutionally suspect
class[,] . . . then courts may uphold the classification only if it is ‘precisely tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest.’”).
49
Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Motion to Dismiss
Indictment, supra note 38, at 4–5.
50
Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1.
45
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court declared that § 922(g)(9) passes constitutional muster under the
doctrine of strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest. 51 The government has a compelling
interest in protecting the families of individuals convicted of
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence because they pose the
greatest harm to their families. 52 The court noted that the Supreme
Court’s acknowledgement of the existence of “longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” in Heller 53 is an
express recognition of the fact that an individual may forfeit his right
to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment when he commits
a crime determined by the legislature to be of a serious nature. 54
Furthermore, the court noted that in enacting § 922(g)(9), Congress
designated misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence as being serious
in nature. 55
Judge Crabb then considered whether existing Seventh Circuit
precedent upholding § 922(g)(9), based on the interpretation of the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as a collective right,
should be upheld in light of Heller I. 56 The court referenced the
Seventh Circuit decision in Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, which
served as precedent in the district court case. 57 The Gillespie court had
noted that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
United States v. Miller and its progeny confirm that the Second
Amendment does not establish an individual right to possess a firearm
independent from the role that possession of a firearm might play in
maintaining a militia. 58 Therefore, the court reasoned that § 922(g)(9)
51

Id. (“[Section 922(g)(9)] is narrowly tailored: it applies only to persons who
have been found guilty by a court of domestic violence.”).
52
Id.
53
Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626.
54
Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1.
55
Id.
56
Id. at *2.
57
Id.
58
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The
link that the [Second Amendment] draws between the ability ‘to keep and bear
Arms’ and ‘[a] well regulated Militia’ suggests that the right protected is limited, one
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is constitutional in the Seventh Circuit up and until either the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit or the Supreme Court specifically
rules to the contrary. 59 Judge Crabb proceeded to emphasize that the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit previously upheld the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession
statute, 60 and that “[c]onstitutionally speaking, there is nothing
remarkable about the extension of federal firearms disabilities to
persons convicted of misdemeanors, as opposed to felonies.” 61
Therefore, Judge Crabb denied the motion to dismiss the indictment. 62
After reviewing precedent in the Seventh Circuit and in consideration
of the recent Supreme Court decision in Heller I, the court found that §
922(g)(9) is constitutional under the Second Amendment. 63
B. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Skoien appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss. 64 The
defendant’s argument on appeal was that § 922(g)(9), known
colloquially as the Lautenberg Amendment, violated his right to keep
and bear arms under the Second Amendment. 65 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit engaged in a comprehensive review
that inures not to the individual but to the people collectively, its reach extending so
far as is necessary to protect their common interest in protection by a militia.”); see
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that in the absence of a
nexus between the firearm and the preservation or proficiency of a well-regulated
militia, it cannot be said that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right
to keep and bear arms).
59
Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *2.
60
See United States v. Price, 328 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2003) (establishing
that even under the individual rights model for interpreting the Second Amendment,
the right to keep and bear arms can be restricted); accord United States v. Emerson,
270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001).
61
Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 706.
62
Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *2.
63
Id.
64
See Defendant-Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1, Skoien II, 587 F.3d 803 (7th
Cir. 2009) (No. 08-3770).
65
Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 807.
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of the recent Supreme Court decision in Heller I. Writing for the court,
Judge Sykes concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate
standard of review for Skoien’s Second Amendment challenge to the
constitutionality of § 922(g)(9). 66 After reiterating that the doctrine of
intermediate scrutiny requires that a law be substantially related to an
important governmental interest, Judge Sykes stated that the
government has the burden of establishing “a reasonable fit between
its important interest in reducing domestic gun violence and the means
chosen to advance that interest,” namely the permanent disarmament
of domestic violence misdemeanants under the Lautenberg
Amendment. 67 Accordingly, the court vacated the indictment and
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to apply the
doctrine of intermediate scrutiny. 68
To determine whether the doctrine of intermediate scrutiny or
strict scrutiny should apply when reviewing the constitutionality of §
922(g)(9), Judge Sykes noted that the Court in Heller held that the
Second Amendment secures an individual pre-existing right to keep
and bear arms for the defense of self, family, and home. 69 After a
thorough analysis of the text of the Second Amendment and the
founding-era sources of its original conventional meaning, the
Supreme Court in Heller I held that the Second Amendment does not
declare a collective right to keep and bear arms, but rather it
guarantees an individual right to armed defense not limited to service
in a militia. 70
In Heller I, the Court highlighted the importance of logical nexus
between the operative clause and the prefatory clause of the Second
Amendment. 71 The Court began with an analysis of the language of
the operative clause: “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,

66

Id. at 816.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 807; see Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 591–95 (2008).
70
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 598–99; Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 807.
71
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 577–78; Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 806.
67
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shall not be infringed.” 72 The majority in Heller I proceeded to consult
historical sources of information to identify the meaning of the
language of the operative clause at the time of its codification. 73 The
Supreme Court determined that the elements of the operative clause of
the Second Amendment guarantee an individual right to keep and bear
arms in case of confrontation, a meaning that is confirmed by the fact
that the right to keep and bear arms is a natural right. 74 The Seventh
Circuit noted that the Court analyzed the prefatory clause of the
Second Amendment: “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a Free State.” 75 The majority in Heller considered the
aforementioned militia clause alongside the relevant historical
background and concluded that the clause was not a limitation on the
scope of the right to keep and bear arms, but rather it described the
motivating purpose behind codifying the pre-existing right. 76 The
Court concluded that the right was codified in the Second Amendment
to prevent the federal government from disarming the citizenry. 77 The
Seventh Circuit found this reasoning to be highly persuasive. Judge
Sykes then noted that the Court invalidated the District of Columbia’s
handgun ban 78 as unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of
scrutiny that [the Supreme Court] ha[s] applied to enumerated

72

Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 806; see U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 592–96.
74
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 592 (“[The right to keep and bear arms] is not a right
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that
instrument for its existence. The Second [A]mendment declares that it shall not be
infringed . . .”).
75
Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 807; see U.S. CONST. amend. II.
76
Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 807.
77
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 599 (“The prefatory clause does not suggest that
preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right [to
bear arms]; most undoubtedly [they] thought it even more important for self-defense
and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the
citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right . . . was
codified.”).
78
Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 808.
73
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constitutional rights.” 79 In a statement that has the potential to become
as revered as the famous footnote in United States v. Carolene
Products, 80 the Court stated that “nothing in [its] opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” 81 The majority in Skoien II
noted that this list was not exhaustive, and the Supreme Court
identified these presumptively lawful prohibitions only as examples. 82
Judge Sykes noted that the limiting language from Heller I is not
mandatory authority, but rather it is persuasive dicta. 83 Judge Sykes
observed that the Supreme Court failed to shed light on the requisite
standard of scrutiny that should be applied when reviewing these
presumptively lawful regulatory measures. 84 Therefore, Judge Sykes
reasoned that all gun laws, aside from those that are categorically
invalid under Heller I, must be independently justified. 85
The court reasoned that Heller established a framework for
analyzing Second Amendment cases. 86 Under this framework, a
determination must first be made as to whether the gun law at issue is
within the scope of the right to keep and bear arms as it was publicly
understood when it was codified in the Second Amendment. 87 Judge
79

Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628.
See 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (stating that an exception to the
presumption of constitutionality may be made and a heightened standard of judicial
review may be required where “legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution” or is aimed at a “discrete and insular minorit[y]”).
81
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626.
82
Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 808; see Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626 n.26.
83
Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 808.
84
Id.
85
Id. (“[B]eyond [the Court’s reference to presumptively lawful regulatory
measures], it is not entirely clear whether [the aforementioned language] should be
taken to suggest that the listed firearms regulations are presumed to fall outside the
scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the time of the
framing or that they are presumptively lawful under even the highest standard of
scrutiny applicable to laws that encumber constitutional rights.”).
86
Id.
87
Id. at 809.
80
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Sykes noted, “If the government can establish [that a gun law falls
outside the public understanding of the right], then the analysis need
go no further.” 88 If, however, the law at issue regulated conduct falling
within the scope of the right, Judge Sykes declared that the law will be
upheld only if the government can satisfy the applicable level of
scrutiny. 89 The court reasoned that the level of scrutiny is dependent
on “the degree of fit required between the means and the end [and]
how closely the law comes to the core of the right and the severity of
the law’s burden on the right.” 90 Thus, the court in Skoien II
established a nexus test to determine the applicable level of scrutiny
that a court must apply if a law regulates conduct falling within the
scope of the right to keep and bear arms under the Second
Amendment.
Judge Sykes proceeded to employ the framework in Heller I to
ascertain whether § 922(g)(9) violated Skoien’s Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms. The court stated that it would be difficult
to argue that a traditional hunting shotgun falls outside the scope of the
Second Amendment at the time of its adoption.91 The majority in
Heller I highlighted the importance of long guns used for hunting
during the founding era; 92 ergo, Judge Sykes stated that the possession
of standard hunting shotguns did not fall outside the parameters of the
right as it was publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was
ratified. 93 However, the government did not try to justify § 922(g)(9)
on a historical basis. 94 Therefore, Judge Sykes proceeded to the
second inquiry under Heller I, which required the court to determine
88

Id.
Id.
90
Id. (noting that this framework emphasizes the importance that the Supreme
Court placed on the original meaning of the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms, while simultaneously “attempt[ing] to reconcile the Court’s invalidation
of the D.C. gun ban ‘under any standard of scrutiny’ with its reference to the
existence of ‘presumptively lawful’ exceptions to the right to keep and bear arms.”).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 810.
89
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whether the restriction on Skoien’s right to bear arms is justified under
the applicable standard of review. 95 Noting that the Court in Heller I
rejected rational basis review, 96 the minimum level of scrutiny, Judge
Sykes reasoned that gun laws that severely restrict the core right under
the Second Amendment are subject to an exacting scrutiny. 97 Pointing
to the Supreme Court’s dicta regarding presumptively lawful firearm
laws, the court determined that strict scrutiny does not apply to §
922(g)(9). 98 Judge Sykes stated, “The Second Amendment challenge
in this case is several steps removed from the core constitutional right
identified in Heller [I].” 99 Moreover, the court noted that Skoien based
his constitutional challenge on the right to possess his shotgun for the
purpose of hunting, and not on the right of self-defense. 100 Therefore,
because § 922(g)(9) does not severely burden Skoien’s Second
Amendment right to possess a firearm for self-defense, Judge Sykes
held that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review. 101
Under intermediate scrutiny, a challenged law will be upheld if the
government establishes that the law is substantially related to an
important governmental interest. 102 Here, the court held that reducing
domestic violence qualifies as an important governmental interest. 103
Furthermore, the court stated that a substantial nexus existed between
the permanent disarmament of domestic violence misdemeanants
under § 922(g)(9) and the government’s goal of preventing firearm95

Id.
Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
97
Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 811.
98
Id. at 812 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court’s willingness to presume the
constitutionality of various firearms restrictions—especially prohibitions on firearms
[sic] possession by felons—gives us ample reason to believe that strict scrutiny does
not apply here.”).
99
Id.; see Heller I, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding that at the core of the Second
Amendment is the “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense
of hearth and home.”).
100
Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 812.
101
Id.
102
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
103
Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 812.
96
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related violence against domestic partners. 104 Therefore, the court
vacated Skoien’s conviction and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with the aforementioned opinion. 105
C. Rehearing En Banc
In Skoien III, the Seventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc and
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Lautenberg
Amendment is constitutional.106 Chief Judge Easterbrook, writing for
the majority, refused to address the “‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.” 107
The Chief Judge thought it sufficient that the government’s goal of
“preventing armed mayhem” is an important governmental
objective. 108 Furthermore, Chief Judge Easterbrook reasoned that
“[b]oth logic and data” establish a substantial relationship between the
Lautenberg Amendment and the government’s objective of
“preventing armed mayhem.” 109 Although the court declined to apply
a specific standard of scrutiny, it is evident that the court in Skoien III
implicitly applied intermediate scrutiny analysis to uphold the
Lautenberg Amendment. 110 Chief Judge Easterbrook, writing that “the
goal of [the Lautenberg Amendment], preventing armed mayhem, is
an important governmental objective,” 111 and “[b]oth logic and data
establish a substantial relation between [the Lautenberg Amendment]

104

Id.
Id.
106
Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2010).
107
Id. at 641–42.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 642.
110
See id.; see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (holding that a law
survives intermediate scrutiny if it is substantially related to an important
governmental interest).
111
Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 642 (emphasis added).
105
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and [preventing armed mayhem],” 112 used terms of art that indicate the
application of intermediate scrutiny review. 113
It is important to note that Skoien III, decided less than one month
after McDonald, makes no mention of the Court’s holding that the
Second Amendment is incorporated and fully applicable to the States
by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 114
This point is alluded to by Judge Sykes, the sole dissenting judge in
Skoien III. 115 By failing to address the Court’s decision in McDonald,
Judge Sykes argued that “the pertinent question is how contemporary
gun laws should be evaluated to determine whether they infringe the
Second Amendment right [to keep and bear arms for self-defense].” 116
In addition, the Seventh Circuit neglected to examine the corpus of
case law that applies strict scrutiny where a law infringes upon a right
that is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty. 117
III. SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AFTER HELLER I
Despite the perspicuous holding in Heller I, the Supreme Court’s
unwillingness to delve into the “‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire” 118 has
burdened the federal courts with the task of adjudicating Second
Amendment challenges without a clear method for doing so.
Consequently, courts inconsistently utilize a number of approaches to

112

Id. (emphasis added).
See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
114
See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality
opinion).
115
Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 648 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
116
Id.
117
See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3023; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995); Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150
(1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963)
(quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1936)).
118
Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 641–42.
113
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adjudicate Second Amendment challenges. 119 In Heller v. District of
Columbia (Heller II), an action was brought challenging the Firearms
Registration Amendment Act, which was enacted in response to the
Court’s ruling in Heller I, on Second Amendment grounds. 120 The
plaintiffs challenged three provisions of the new act: the firearms
registration procedures, the prohibition on assault weapons, and the
prohibition on devices that feed large capacity ammunition into
firearms. 121
Heller II began with an overview of the various approaches used
by courts to adjudicate Second Amendment challenges in the wake of
Heller I. 122 The court in Heller II determined that five approaches
have been used by courts to review laws accused of violating the
Second Amendment. 123 The first method used by courts is to issue a
ruling without applying a specific standard of scrutiny. 124 Rather, these
courts have simply determined whether the law at issue is a
presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition as identified by Heller
I. 125 Other courts have attempted to tackle the judicial scrutiny
quandary as it applies to Second Amendment challenges.126 A small
number of courts have applied the doctrine of strict scrutiny to Second

119

See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787–90 (E.D.
Va. 2009) (holding that the challenged law is constitutional “under any elevated
level of constitutional scrutiny”); United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161,
162–63 (D. Me. 2008) (“A useful approach is to ask whether a statutory prohibition
against the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill is similar enough to
the statutory prohibition [at issue] to justify its inclusion in the list of ‘longstanding
prohibitions’ [contained in the Heller dictum]”).
120
Heller v. District of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 181 (D.D.C. 2010)
[hereinafter Heller II].
121
Id. at 185.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
See supra note 119.
125
See id.
126
See, e.g., Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
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Amendment challenges, 127 while the majority of courts have held that
intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review. 128 A fourth
approach taken by courts involves applying elements of the undue
burden test that is typically applied in the abortion context. 129 Finally,
a small number of courts have combined the above-mentioned
approaches to form a hybrid method for reviewing Second
Amendment challenges. 130
In Heller II, the court concluded that intermediate scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of review. 131 The court reasoned that the Court in
Heller I “did not explicitly hold that the Second Amendment right is a
fundamental right,” 132 and therefore strict scrutiny did not apply. 133
Although the majority in Heller I suggested that a heightened standard
of review should be applied to laws that interfere with the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms, the court in Heller II
reasoned that “[i]f the Supreme Court had wanted to declare the
Second Amendment right a fundamental right, it would have done so
explicitly.” 134

127

See, e.g., United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah
2009) (upholding the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment under strict
scrutiny because it serves a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly
tailored to serve this interest).
128
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1171 (W.D. Tenn.
2009); United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
129
Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 185–86; see, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d
439, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.
2010); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
130
Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 186; see e.g., Skoien II, 587 F.3d 803, 812 (7th
Cir. 2009).
131
Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
132
Id. at 187.
133
Id.
134
Id. (“The court will not infer such a significant holding based on the Heller
majority’s oblique references to the gun ownership rights of eighteenth-century
English subjects.”); see United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir.
2003) (“if [a court] intended to recognize that the individual right to keep and bear
arms is a ‘fundamental right,’ in the sense that restrictions on this right are subject to
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In United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, the defendant was charged with
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). 135 The
defendant argued that the statute, which prohibits the possession of a
firearm by an illegal alien, violates his Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms. 136 In Yanez-Vasquez, the court rebuffed the
defendant’s contention that strict scrutiny should apply. 137 The court
declined to apply strict scrutiny because Heller I did not expressly
declare that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a
fundamental right. 138
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller I, it is
evident that a number of courts, adjudicating cases challenging
legislation under the Second Amendment, are engaging in a literal
reading of the Court’s dictum. The Heller I dictum regarding
presumptively lawful longstanding prohibitions has been interpreted
by courts to disqualify the use of strict scrutiny review for Second
Amendment claims. 139 A second, related problem, illustrated by a
handful of courts, is an unwillingness to engage in meaningful judicial
scrutiny. Rather than engage in meaningful judicial review, a number
of courts merely determine whether the Lautenberg Amendment is
“presumptively lawful” under Heller I. In United States v. White, the
court proclaimed that they were tasked with “decid[ing] whether the
statutory prohibition against the possession of firearms by persons
convicted of the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence . . . warrants
inclusion on [Heller I’s] list of presumptively lawful longstanding
prohibitions.” 140 This approach is problematic because judicial
scrutiny is disregarded. Rather than assessing whether the means and
ends of a statutory prohibition are related to an important or
‘strict scrutiny’ by the courts and require a ‘compelling state interest,’ it would have
used these constitutional terms of art.”) (emphasis added).
135
United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112,
at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010).
136
Id.
137
Id. at *5.
138
Id.
139
See cases cited supra notes 119–20.
140
United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010).
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compelling governmental interest, the court merely determines
whether the prohibition at issue is analogous with the brief list of
presumptively lawful longstanding prohibitions identified in Heller
I. 141 Moreover, courts engaging in this unmethodical standard of
review fail to heed the words of the Court in Heller I. The Court stated
that there a number of “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms,” 142 and emphasized that these prohibitions are
“presumptively lawful.” 143 Yet the court in White and Skoien III appear
to ignore the term “presumptively.” 144 Neither court engaged in the
heightened standard of review required by Heller I. 145 Had the Court
desired to establish a neoteric standard of review based on
presumptively lawful longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms, it would have done so explicitly. In addition, the Court would
not have referred to these longstanding prohibitions as being
“presumptively lawful” in nature if it intended for this locution to
serve as a standard of judicial review.
Expanding on Heller I, McDonald v. City of Chicago is a
landmark Supreme Court case that places federal courts in a position
to implement strict scrutiny review in the area of Second Amendment
jurisprudence. 146 Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, held that the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is
incorporated and fully applicable to the States by virtue of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 147 The Court in
McDonald, charged with determining whether the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms applied to the States, exercised the legal
doctrine of incorporation to hold that the Second Amendment is

141

See, e.g., id. at 1205–06.
Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
143
Id. at 627 n.26 (emphasis added).
144
Id.
145
See id. at 628 n.27; Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010).
146
See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
147
Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion).
142
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applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 148
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in
relevant part, that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” 149 Drawing largely on the
historical record surrounding the framing and incorporation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 150 Justice Alito held that the right to keep and
bear arms for self-defense is fundamental to our scheme of ordered
liberty. 151
The Court’s decision in McDonald may have profound
implications for the manner in which courts evaluate the
constitutionality of laws prohibiting the possession of firearms. It is
“widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and
Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.” 152 These rights are
so “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” 153 that they
are fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty. 154 Accordingly, the

148

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
150
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036–44.
151
Id. at 3042; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). But cf.
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3059–62 (Thomas, J., concurring) (Although Justice
Thomas agreed with the Court that the right to keep and bear arms is applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, he argued that incorporation through
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause, is a more
straightforward path. Justice Thomas stated that “fundamental” rights, some of
which are not enumerated in the Constitution, are a legal fiction that arose in
response to the marginalization of the Privileges or Immunities Clause following the
Court’s decision in the Slaughter-House Cases); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1873) (determining that there is a sharp distinction between the privileges and
immunities of state and those of federal citizenship, and the Privileges or Immunities
Clause protects only the latter category of rights from State infringement).
152
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3066; Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008)
(emphasis in original).
153
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3023 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
154
See supra note 146; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
149
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Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the
case for further proceedings in accordance with their decision. 155
IV. A CASE FOR THE ADOPTION OF STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW
In light of McDonald, there is ample evidence to support the
application of strict scrutiny review to legislation that infringes on the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.
Although the right is not unqualified, laws encumbering fundamental
rights are often subjected to strict scrutiny review. 156
Strict scrutiny was conceived by implication in a footnote of
United States v. Carolene Products 157 and is currently the most
exacting form of judicial scrutiny. To withstand strict scrutiny review,
the government has the burden of proving that the challenged law is
narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. 158
Supreme Court precedent often requires that laws restricting
fundamental rights be evaluated under strict scrutiny, 159 as
intermediate scrutiny is an insufficient standard of review for
legislation that infringes on fundamental rights. Intermediate scrutiny
is a less exacting form of scrutiny and requires that a law be
substantially related to an important governmental objective. 160 In
other words, a court need not find that the government’s purpose is
compelling, but it must characterize the objective as important. In

155

McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
See supra note 117. But see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)
(holding that the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, while a fundamental
right in nature, is subject to a flexible standard of review for ballot-access
restrictions).
157
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
158
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (upholding the admissions
policy of the University of Michigan Law School).
159
See cases cited supra note 117.
160
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
156
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order to trigger intermediate scrutiny, a law must “implicate an
important, though not constitutional, right.” 161
Legal scholars and judicial opinions have suggested that strict
scrutiny is an outcome-determinative standard of judicial review.
According to legal scholar Paul Kahn, “[C]ontemporary equal
protection law has essentially identified ‘exacting’ judicial scrutiny
with judicial invalidation.” 162 The Supreme Court has echoed these
sentiments, noting that “[o]nly rarely are statutes sustained in the face
of strict scrutiny.” 163 In fact, this is an easy argument to make when
reviewing Warren Court decisions. The Warren Court used strict
scrutiny review to invalidate a number of laws and extend
constitutional protections to various fundamental rights. 164 “[O]nce the
Court sorts the case into one or another constitutional bin [strict
scrutiny or rational basis], the outcome is virtually foreordained.” 165
This argument has been reiterated in the wake of Heller I, 166 but it
remains unfounded. 167
161

United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1999); see Eisenbud
v. Suffolk County, 841 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1988).
162
Paul W. Kahn, The Court, The Community, and the Judicial Balance: The
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1987).
163
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 n.6 (1984) (citing Gerald Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972)).
164
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (invalidating a
statutory prohibition of welfare benefits to residents of less than one year because it
impermissibly restricted the right to travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12
(1967) (invalidating legislation banning miscegenation); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 405–06 (1963) (invalidating a law restricting the freedom of religious
expression); see also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793,
805 (2006).
165
Winkler, supra note 164, at 807 (quoting JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED,
CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 55
(1997)).
166
E.g., Skoien II, 587 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that strict scrutiny
is a demanding standard of judicial review that is intentionally difficult to overcome,
“in deference to the primacy of the individual liberties the Constitution secures.”);
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Strict scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.” 168 The
phrase “strict in theory and fatal in fact,” 169 penned by Gerald
Gunther, has become “one of the most quoted lines in legal
literature” 170 and has been parroted in numerous judicial opinions. 171
Recently, the Supreme Court has attempted to expunge the belief that
strict scrutiny is an outcome-determinative test, always resulting in
invalidation of the challenged legislation. In Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, Justice O’Connor declared that the Court intended to
“dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.’” 172 Justice O’Connor argued that requiring strict scrutiny is the
most effective way to ensure that courts consistently engage in a
detailed examination of both the ends and means of a challenged
law. 173 In Johnson v. California, Justice O’Conner again argued
against the notion that strict scrutiny is fatal in fact, writing that “[t]he
fact that strict scrutiny applies ‘says nothing about the ultimate validity
of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court
applying strict scrutiny.’” 174 In a recent case, Grutter v. Bollinger, the
Supreme Court upheld the affirmative action admission policy at the
University of Michigan Law School. 175 Justice O’Connor, writing for
the majority, declared that the school’s use of race in its admissions
Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1197 (2009)
(arguing that the discussion of presumptively lawful longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms in Heller must be read as an implicit rejection of strict
scrutiny review).
167
See supra note 158.
168
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (quoting Gunther, supra note 163, at 8).
169
Gunther, supra note 163, at 8.
170
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Gerald Gunther: The Man and the Scholar, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 643, 645 (2002).
171
See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 361–62 (1978).
172
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
173
Id.
174
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) (quoting Adarand, 515
U.S. at 229–30).
175
539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
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policy was narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest in the
unique education benefits that emanate from a diverse student body. 176
A number of legal scholars have aligned themselves with Justice
O’Connor. According to Adam Winkler, “[S]trict scrutiny exists
precisely to permit regulation where ordinarily none is allowed.” 177
Others have argued that strict scrutiny review is becoming less
rigorous, as evidenced by the aforementioned decisions. Ashutosh
Bhagwat argued that the relaxation of strict scrutiny review is due to a
sudden willingness by the Court to engage in genuine inquiry of
legislative purposes. 178
In Grutter, Justice O’Connor asserted that “context matters” when
strict scrutiny is applied. 179 Context is equally relevant to a
determination of the applicable standard of review in Skoien III. In
Skoien II, Judge Sykes noted the importance of context in the First
Amendment sphere. Judge Sykes, in an attempt to analogize the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech with the Second Amendment,
noted that “[i]n the First Amendment free-speech context, the rigor of
this heightened form of review tends to fluctuate with the character
and degree of the challenged law’s burden on the right”.180 In the
realm of election regulations, laws that restrict the right to expressive
association are subject to varying levels of scrutiny depending upon
the nature and severity of the burden on the right; laws that impose
severe burdens are subject to strict scrutiny, while regulatory measures
imposing more modest burdens are reviewed more leniently. 181 In the
Second Amendment realm, while recent decisions have focused on the
relationship between the right of “law-abiding, responsible citizens to

176

Id. at 343.
Winkler, supra note 164, at 805.
178
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL L.
REV. 297, 299 (1997).
179
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
180
Skoien II, 587 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2009).
181
Id.; see, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552
U.S. 442 (2008).
177
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use arms in defense of hearth and home,” 182 the Court in Heller I
stated that Americans valued the ancient right to keep and bear arms
for self-defense and hunting. 183 Judge Sykes acknowledged this
ancient right, but argued that the right to keep and bear arms for
hunting was not analogous to the core Second Amendment right
identified in Heller I. 184 However, the decisions in Skoien II and
Skoien III neglected to take context into account. While the court in
Skoien II failed to consider the legislative intent behind the enactment
of the Lautenberg Amendment, the court in Skoien III neglected to
evaluate the severity of the burden imposed by the amendment. The
Lautenberg Amendment imposes a severe burden on the right to keep
and bear arms for self-defense under the Second Amendment; 185 the
amendment “bars all persons who have been convicted of a domesticviolence misdemeanor from ever possessing a firearm for any
reason.” 186 The court emphasized that “[i]t is a comprehensive lifetime
ban; . . . [t]here are no exceptions.” 187 This is a considerable burden
for an individual to bear. Irrespective of whether Skoien had focused
his constitutional challenge on the core Second Amendment right of
self-defense, as identified in Heller I, 188 his conviction under §
922(g)(9) will permanently bar Skoien from possessing a firearm “for
any reason,” 189 including self-defense.
When examined alongside McDonald, the nature of the
imposition and severity of the burden on the right to keep and bear
arms for self-defense under the Lautenberg Amendment necessitates
the use of strict scrutiny.

182

See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
Id. at 599.
184
Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 812.
185
See infra note 235.
186
Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 811 (emphasis in original).
187
Id.
188
See id. at 812.
189
Id. at 811.
183
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A. Narrow Tailoring
To pass constitutional muster, legislation subject to strict scrutiny
review must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest. 190 Narrow tailoring requires serious, good faith
consideration of reasonable alternatives that would achieve the
government’s legislative goal. 191 Narrow tailoring does not, however,
require an exhaustive review of every conceivable alternative. 192 It is
therefore imperative to evaluate the objective of the legislature in
ratifying § 922(g)(9).
The Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968 is
a sweeping regulatory statute that was enacted to prevent the use of
firearms in violent domestic disputes. 193 Amid a growing concern that
permitting domestic aggressors to possess firearms would have grave
consequences for domestic victims, the Lautenberg Amendment was
enacted to disqualify individuals convicted of misdemeanor crimes of
domestic violence from possessing firearms. 194 Senator Lautenberg
sought to disarm domestic aggressors because “[e]ven after a split, the
individuals involved often by necessity have a continuing relationship
of some sort.” 195
In Heller I, the Supreme Court noted that its decision does not
cast doubt on a number of longstanding prohibitions on the possession
of firearms by well-defined groups of individuals. 196 The Lautenberg
Amendment has been categorized as a lawful prohibition on the
possession of firearms, 197 and states in relevant part:

190

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
192
Id.
193
142 CONG. REC. S2646-01 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg).
194
Id.
195
Id. at S2646-02.
196
Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
197
See Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010).
191
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It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm
or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce. 198
While the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) have been a source of
legal controversy, the judiciary has upheld the constitutionality of the
Lautenberg Amendment. 199 In United States v. Hayes, the Supreme
Court took the opportunity to examine the Lautenberg Amendment
and inquire into the reasoning behind its enactment. 200 In Hayes, the
defendant was indicted and charged under § 922(g)(9) for possessing
firearms after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence. 201 The defendant was originally charged and
convicted in 1994 under a West Virginia statute that did not require a
domestic relationship between the aggressor and victim, but rather was
a common battery prohibition. 202 The defendant moved to dismiss the
indictment on the grounds that § 922(g)(9) applies only to individuals
previous convicted of an offense that specifies, as an element, a
domestic relationship between the offender and victim. 203 Writing for
the majority, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that construing § 922(g)(9) to
exclude persons who engaged in domestic abuse and were convicted
under a generic use-of-force statute—one that does not require a
198

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006).
See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding
that § 922(g)(9) warrants inclusion on the list of presumptively lawful longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms); In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1200
(10th Cir. 2009) (order granting petition for writ of mandamus) (“Nothing suggests
that the Heller dictum, which we must follow, is not inclusive of § 922(g)(9)
involving those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence.”).
200
See generally 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009).
201
Id. at 1087.
202
Id. at 1083.
203
Id.
199
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domestic relationship—“would frustrate Congress’ manifest
purpose.” 204 The government must, however, prove the existence of a
domestic relationship in order to establish that the underlying
misdemeanor qualifies as a predicate offense. 205 In order to
substantiate her claim, Justice Ginsburg looked to § 921(a)(33)(A),
which defines the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as
an offense that:
(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law; and
(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical
force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed
by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the
victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in
common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited
with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of
the victim. 206
Justice Ginsburg determined that the definition contained in §
922(a)(33)(A) contains two requirements: First, a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence must “[have], as an element, the use or attempted
use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon”; 207
and second, the crime must be “committed by” an individual who has
a particular domestic relationship with the victim as identified by the
statute. 208 In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that existing felon-in204

Id. at 1087.
Id.
206
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2006); see United States v. White, 593 F.3d
1199, 1204 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the defendant’s relationship with his livein girlfriend constituted a domestic relationship for the purposes of §§ 922(g)(9) and
921(a)(33)(A)); United States v. Shelton, 325 F.3d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding
that defendant’s concession that he lived with his girlfriend was sufficient to satisfy
the domestic relationship requirement under §§ 922(g)(9) and 921(a)(33)(A)).
207
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).
208
Id.; Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1084.
205
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possession laws failed to keep firearms out of the hands of persons
who engaged in domestic abuse, 209 writing that the language of §
921(a)(33)(A) does not require that the predicate offense include, as an
individual element, the existence of a domestic relationship between
the offender and victim. 210 Rather, it is sufficient that the prior crime
was an offense committed by the defendant against a domestic victim
as proscribed by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). 211 Accordingly, the Court in
Hayes held that “Congress defined ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence’ to include an offense ‘committed by’ a person who had a
specified domestic relationship with the victim, whether or not the
misdemeanor statute itself designates the domestic relationship as an
element of the crime.” 212
Dissenting from the majority in Skoien III, Judge Sykes reiterated
many of the arguments made in Skoien II. A number of these
assertions are analogous with the Court’s holding in Hayes. 213 Judge
Sykes noted that the statutory definition of misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence limits the applicability of § 922(g)(9) to persons
who used or attempted to use physical force, or threatened the use of a
deadly weapon against a domestic victim. 214 The statute thus applies
only to a narrowly defined class of violent offender: “only those who
have already used or attempted to use force or have threatened the use
of a deadly weapon against a domestic victim are banned from
possessing firearms.” 215
While attempting to analogize the Lautenberg Amendment to the
list of presumptively lawful longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms in Heller I, the court in White inadvertently
209

Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1093; see 142 CONG. REC. S2646-02 (1996) (statement
of Sen. Frank Lautenberg).
210
Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1084.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 1089.
213
See Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., dissenting).
214
See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2006); Skoien II, 587 F.3d 803, 816 (7th
Cir. 2009).
215
Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 816; see Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes, J.,
dissenting).
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called attention to the narrow tailoring of the Lautenberg
Amendment. 216 By noting that the Lautenberg Amendment was
designed to “close [a] dangerous loophole” that permitted domestic
abusers to possess firearms, 217 the court highlighted an element of the
Lautenberg Amendment that exudes narrow tailoring: it was enacted to
close a loophole. A ‘loophole’ is defined as “[a]n ambiguity, omission,
or exception . . . that provides a way to avoid a rule without violating
its literal requirements.” 218 In the eyes of Congress, domestic abusers
were narrowly escaping felony convictions. 219 As a result, the
Lautenberg Amendment was enacted to bring domestic violence
misdemeanants under the scope of the felon-in-possession ban.
The White court proceeded to note that the felon-in-possession
ban, a presumptively lawful prohibition under Heller I, 220 results in
both an armed robber and tax evader losing their right to possess a
firearm under § 922(g)(1). 221 The court contrasted this outcome with
that of an individual convicted under the Lautenberg Amendment. 222
For the Lautenberg Amendment to apply, an individual must have first
acted violently toward a family member or domestic partner, a
predicate offense demonstrated by a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence conviction. 223 Although the court illustrated this distinction to
substantiate its claim that the Lautenberg Amendment warrants
inclusion in the list of presumptively lawful prohibitions recognized in
Heller I, 224 the court perfectly distinguished an overinclusive law from
a law that is underinclusive. In determining whether challenged
legislation is narrowly tailored, courts favor laws that are
216

See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1205 (citing 142 CONG. REC. S2646-02 (1996) (statement of Sen.
Frank Lautenberg)).
218
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 962 (8th ed. 2004).
219
White, 593 F.3d at 1205.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 1206.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id.
217
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underinclusive rather than overinclusive. 225 In White, the court noted
that the felon-in-possession ban in § 922(g)(1) “does not distinguish
between the violent and non-violent offender.” 226 Thus, the domestic
violence misdemeanant ban under the Lautenberg Amendment, which
applies only to a particular class of abusive misdemeanants, is
narrowly tailored.
B. Compelling Governmental Interest
In Korematsu v. United States, 227 an early Supreme Court case
involving the application of strict scrutiny review, the Court
determined that “[p]ressing public necessity” may sometimes warrant
interference with constitutional rights. 228 Courts are likely to uphold
challenged legislation when there is a pressing public necessity, such
as national security. 229 A pressing public necessity must still be
narrowly tailored, irrespective of the nature of the necessity. 230 In
Grutter, Justice O’Connor noted that, in the area of race based
classifications, “[w]here the Court has accepted only national security,
and rejected even the best interests of a child, as a justification for
racial discrimination, I conclude that only those measures the State
must take . . . to prevent violence, will constitute a ‘pressing public
necessity.’” 231 Today, “pressing public policy,” frequently termed

225

See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[Legislative]
reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem
which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”); Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of
San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 293 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003) (“narrow tailoring . . . prohibits
regulations [of adult businesses] that are substantially broader than necessary”)
(alteration in original) (emphasis added).
226
White, 593 F.3d at 1206.
227
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
228
Id.; accord Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351 (2003).
229
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
230
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351.
231
Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
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“compelling governmental interest,” 232 is still without a bright-line
rule.
The Gun Control Act of 1968 has long prohibited the possession
of a firearm by any individual convicted of a felony. 233 In 2006, the
104th United States Congress saw the opportunity to extend the
prohibition to include individuals convicted of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence. 234 Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey, the
sponsor of the provision, sought to close the dangerous loophole that
enabled a person convicted of a crime involving domestic violence to
possess a firearm. 235 The senator recognized that existing prohibitions
against felony possession failed to keep firearms out of the hands of
domestic abusers because “many people who engage in serious
spousal or child abuse ultimately are not charged with or convicted of
felonies.” 236 Senator Lautenberg referenced data from a New England
Journal of Medicine report, indicating that a gun inside the residence
of a home with a history of domestic abuse results in a five hundred
percent increase in the likelihood that a woman would be murdered. 237
Crimes of domestic violence involve persons who share a history
together, 238 yet many who commit these heinous offenses are never
prosecuted. 239 One-third of individuals who commit crimes of
domestic violence and are charged with misdemeanors would be
charged as felons if the act were committed against a stranger. 240
Senators Patricia Murray and Dianne Feinstein joined Senator
Lautenberg in supporting the amendment because “the gun is the key
ingredient most likely to turn a domestic violence incident into a

232

Id.
United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1082 (2009).
234
142 CONG. REC. S2646-01 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg).
235
Id. at S2646-02.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
142 CONG. REC. S8831-06 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg).
240
Id.
233
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homicide.” 241 Senator Feinstein cited ineffective and outdated laws as
the reason many domestic violence offenders are not charged as
felons. 242 The senator also proclaimed that plea bargains and the
reluctance of victims to cooperate, either out of fear of additional
violence or an unwillingness to partake in an overwhelming trial,
result in misdemeanor convictions for crimes that ordinarily are
felonies. 243
By enacting § 922(g)(9), it is evident that Congress endeavored to
narrow the gap that permitted individuals convicted of misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence to possess a firearm. Senator Lautenberg
and his colleagues were concerned that permitting aggressors to
possess firearms would have parlous consequences for domestic
violence victims. 244 In the First Amendment free speech context, a
federal statute banning the broadcast of indecent material during a
specified period of time during the day passed constitutional muster
because the government has a valid interest in supplementing parental
supervision of children’s exposure to indecent material and promoting
the well-being of minors. 245
The Lautenberg Amendment satisfies two compelling
governmental interests. The domestic violence misdemeanant firearm
ban closes a dangerous loophole that previously allowed individuals
who engaged in serious spousal or child abuse to possess a firearm.
Were it not for mitigating circumstances, these individuals would be
convicted as felons and subject to the felon-in-possession handgun ban
under § 922(g)(9). By keeping firearms out of the hands of violent
domestic offenders, the Lautenberg Amendment also serves the
compelling governmental interest of preventing violence against
spouses and children. 246 Furthermore, based on the assertion that the
241

142 Cong. Rec. S10379-01 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patricia Murray).
Id. at 10380 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
243
Id.
244
See 142 CONG. REC. S2646-02 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank
Lautenberg).
245
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 678 (D.C. Cir 1995).
246
See supra note 193.
242
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government has both a legitimate and compelling interest in
preventing crime, 247 one would be hard-pressed to challenge the
assertion that the government has a strong interest in preventing
domestic abusers from possessing firearms. 248
CONCLUSION
Some may question the significance of debating the appropriate
standard of scrutiny for laws that infringe on the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms. 249 However, in the absence of an explicit
standard of review for Second Amendment jurisprudence, the federal
courts are left without a clear standard for resolving challenges to
existing firearm legislation.
The view of the Rehnquist Court, that strict scrutiny is strict in
theory and not fatal in fact, should herald the use of strict scrutiny
review in adjudicating challenges to laws that strike at the core Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. 250 Shortly
after the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in McDonald, wherein
the Court held that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
for self-defense is incorporated and fully applicable to the States by
virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 251 the
Seventh Circuit was presented with the opportunity to address the
“‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire” 252 left unanswered by Heller I. 253
247

See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987).
See 142 CONG. REC. S2646-02 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank
Lautenberg); see also Matthew Miller et al., State-Level Homicide Victimization
Rates in the U.S. in Relation to Survey Measures of Household Firearm Ownership,
2001–2003, 2/1/07 SOC. SCI. & MED. 656 (2003).
249
Cf. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“This dispute regarding the appropriate standard of review may strike
some as a lawyers’ quibble over words”). But cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250
See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).
251
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality
opinion).
252
Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010).
248
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Rather than attempting to determine the appropriate standard of
judicial scrutiny, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the
Lautenberg Amendment need only satisfy heightened scrutiny to pass
constitutional muster. 254 Thus, by turning a blind eye to recent federal
practice, the Seventh Circuit overlooked an opportunity to solidify its
position as a dynamic, erudite court by pioneering the implementation
of strict scrutiny review for legislation that unconstitutionally
interferes with the core Second Amendment right.

253
254

See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–30.
See Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 641–42.
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